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David Stenhouse’s classical definition of intelligence as “adaptively variable behavior within the
lifetime of the individual” (Stenhouse, 1974, in Trewavas, 2003), widely accepted among biologists,
explicitly refers to behavior, requiring thus a previous understanding of this concept. Here, we
are providing a biologists’ perspective, which may differ from that of psychologists, economists
or cognitive scientists, in hope that we may prompt colleagues from those fields to participate in
quest for a common language.
BEHAVIOR IS NOT DEFINED CONSISTENTLY
It is a common misconception that rigorous scientific study is impossible without an unambiguous
definition of its subject, although the definition may evolve together with the field of research.
A good definition ought to be operational (i.e., providing criteria to discern entities that fit it),
essential (i.e., only including necessary and sufficient attributes), widely applicable and succinct
(Levitis et al., 2009). Nevertheless, whole scientific fields continue to flourish without a consensual
definition of their subject. Biology is a prime example: Barbieri (2003) lists over 60 definitions
of life from the scientific literature, about a third of them quite recent. Similarly, cognitive
sciences apparently can live without a clear-cut formal definition of cognition (Abramson,
2013; Whissell et al., 2013), and the same holds for the definition of behavior. Within the
field of psychology, a wide consensus is as far nowadays as it was nearly a century ago
(Robinson, 1918, Abramson and Place, 2005), and the situation is not better in biology. Levitis
et al. (2009) collected about 25 different operational definitions of behavior from biological
literature. In a survey among biologists engaged in behavioral research, they then asked the
respondents to decide on a collection of general statements describing candidate essential features
of behavior, and to determine which specific examples of biological phenomena constitute
behavior. Somewhat disconcertingly, even professional scholars often based their views on intuitive
understanding rather than on formal criteria, and sometimes expressed internally inconsistent
opinions.
Unlike in e.g., mathematics, the absence of formal definitions does not seriously hamper
fruitful research in empirical natural sciences such as biology, as long as some consensual intuitive
understanding of the central concepts exists. This apparently is the case for life, cognition, and
behavior, concepts borrowed from everyday speech and hence endowed with a broad semantic field
(compare Robinson, 1918; Markoš and Cvrcˇková, 2013). Insisting on formal definitions may even
get in the way of progress if these happen to (unwillingly) exclude areas of interest that otherwise
might be relevant. Unfortunately, exactly this may be now happening in respect to the concept of
“behavior.”
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THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT
Many attempts to define behavior are rooted in animal
biology and psychology, emphasizing a clear demarcation line
between behavior and development. The latter is generally
acknowledged merely as one of many important factors
shaping behavior, together with evolutionary, hereditary and
environmental influences (e.g., Bertossa, 2011; Crews et al.,
2015), leading to an exclusive “development of behavior”
perspective. Hence the proposed consensus definition of behavior
as “the internally coordinated responses (actions or inactions) of
whole living organisms (individuals or groups) to internal and/or
external stimuli, excluding responses more easily understood as
developmental changes” (Levitis et al., 2009). This view is widely
shared (e.g., Bertossa, 2011) and is easily understandable in the
context of animal ontogeny with its body plans and more or
less rigorously set developmental pathways. However, no such
sharp line is considered between behavioral and physiological
processes; indeed, a strict separation of these fields would
disqualify, e.g., I.P. Pavlov’s classical conditioning experiments
with drooling dogs (reviewed in Jarius and Wildermann, 2015).
An implicit feature of behavior is present in many definitions,
and in nearly all of the examples in the above-cited study (Levitis
et al., 2009), though not always overtly: behavior is generally
assumed to involve active (and, at best, rapid) movement in the
physical space. Consequently, most of the behavioral responses
studied in psychology and ethology are linked to locomotion,
which does not occur in plants. Many scholars (including some
plant biologists) thus easily agree that behavior is not a useful
concept for describing what plants do. This brings memories of
an important lesson from the history. A similar tacit assumption
concerning sex, which was also considered to be inseparable from
locomotion, together with a non-reflected belief in a fundamental
difference between animals and the rest of the living world
(traceable to Aristotle), has hampered acceptance of the idea that
plants are sexual organisms. Many prominent scholars denied
plant sexuality up to the beginning of the 19th century, long after
its initial description by A. Zalužanský at the end of the 16th
century and by the better known J. Camerarius a century later
(see Žárský and Tupý, 1995; Funk, 2013). We suggest that similar
non-reflected assumptions may contribute to the problem of
defining behavior in a manner which would not severally restrict
the field of phenomena observable in plants that can (and should)
be studied from the behavioral perspective.
We believe that in plants development, physiological
responses, and behavior always go hand in hand. Plant behavior
in the sense of the above-cited exclusive definition would be
limited merely to rare instances of organ movements as in
Mimosa pudica (reviewed in Abramson and Chicas-Mosier,
2016), a somewhat marginal topic for the plant biologists
engaged in the nascent fields of “plant intelligence studies” (e.g.,
Trewavas, 2003; Meyer et al., 2014; Trewavas, 2014; van Loon,
2016, for additional references see Calvo and Baluška, 2015) or
“plant behavioral ecology” (Cahill and McNickle, 2011; Gianoli,
2015). As sessile organisms whose cells are enclosed in relatively
rigid cell walls, plants move through the physical space, slowly
but surely, by growing—through extending existing organs
and generating new ones, often in response to environmental
cues. Plant post-embryonic ontogeny follows a species-specific
algorithm rather than a body plan, based on plastic use of
repetitive modules, incessantly shaped by the environment and
by individual experience. Thus, plant biologists understand
behavior as encompassing developmental plasticity within
the limits of a broad norm of reaction (Crews et al., 2015) or
phenotypic space (Pigliucci, 2010), in an inclusive “development
as behavior” perspective (Trewavas, 2009). Such a position,
generally compatible e.g., with the current theoretical framework
of the Developmental Systems Theory (Oyama, 2000), or with
the notion of ontogeny as a manifestation of species-specific
culture (Markoš, 2002), can be traced back to Darwin’s classical
work on the growth and movement of root tips (Darwin and
Darwin, 1880), and allows characterizing processes such as
navigation of roots across obstacles, including other roots (Falik
et al., 2005; Depuydt, 2014), non-genetic individual variability of
seed dormancy breaking (Silvertown, 1984, but see Wagmann
et al., 2012 for a critical re-evaluation of the extent of such
variability) or sprouting of dormant buds (Thellier et al., 2004),
in terms of behavioral biology (e.g., Ciszak et al., 2012). Yet,
in the above-cited survey (Levitis et al., 2009), only two of the
examples to be judged as “behavior or something else” involved
plants (photonastic movement of mature leaves and closure
of stomata), and the respondents thus had no opportunity to
decide whether developmental plasticity should be interpreted as
behavior.
AN ATTEMPT AT AN INCLUSIVE
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
We are thus dealing with two mutually incompatible views
of behavior: (i) an exclusive one, represented by the working
definition proposed by Levitis et al. (2009), possibly well suited
for animal studies but obviously too restrictive for plants,
and (ii) an inclusive one, which may become problematic in
animal studies. Reducing the working definition of behavior
to “internally coordinated responses (actions or inactions) of
whole living organisms (individuals or groups) to internal and/or
external stimuli” would not solve our problem, since it would
classify every developmental change as behavior. Behavioral
biologists are unlikely to make such a concession. Unless
we accept separate lineage-specific definitions for animals and
plants, a new definition should encompass a consensus between
animal-oriented and plant-oriented biologists. Levitis et al.
(2009) found such a consensus both overall and within each
group (as opposed to an overall majority consensus, biased by the
majority of animal biologists in the poll) only for the following
three statements:
“A developmental change is usually not a behavior.” In the light
of plant biology tradition this is somewhat puzzling, hinting
at the need to examine what is understood as developmental
change by animal and plant biologists. Growth and production
of vegetative organs may not be perceived as a “change” by
plant biologists, because it is just something plants do all
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the time. Moreover, the magic word “usually” leaves some
interpretation freedom. Perhaps this statement should be
rephrased to distinguish between developmental processes
following a strict, genetically determined plan, such as early
animal embryogenesis, or development of a single flower,
and those involving decisions made within broader limits
permitted by a species-specific developmental algorithm. The
latter, in our opinion, should be admitted as behavior.
“Behavior is always influenced by the internal processes of the
individual.”
“A behavior is always in response to a stimulus or set of stimuli,
but the stimulus can be either internal or external.” While the
last two statements do not present any obvious problem, it is
worth noting that internal processes and stimuli also include
memory traces of past experience (see Cvrcˇková et al., 2009).
Remarkably, a marked disagreement between animal and plant
biologists was found concerning two proposed features of
behavior in the Levitis et al. (2009) study. Only plant biologists
were willing to admit the status of behavior to phenomena
comprising only parts of individuals, which is understandable
given the problematic nature of individuality in plants (Clarke,
2012). Because animal behavior is commonly accepted as
occurring at the level of both individuals and groups (such as
flocks of birds or swarms of insects), we propose to substitute
“living entities,” understood as automomous agents (Kauffman,
2000), instead of “whole living organisms (individuals or groups).”
This would also legitimize the existing use of the concept of
behavior in cell-level studies (e.g., Tokoyoda et al., 2004; Marrone
et al., 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 2014, and many others). On
the other hand, animal biologists surprisingly often disagreed
with the statement that behavior must be directly observable,
recordable, and measurable, supported by a majority of plant
biologists (Levitis et al., 2009). It is, however, not clear whether
the disagreement was caused by the requirement for observability
or (more likely) by the word “directly.” Neither of these two
features should therefore be central to our proposed definition.
Taking into account the considerations discussed above, we
propose defining behavior as “observable consequences of the
choices a living entity makes in response to external or internal
stimuli.” We emphasize that the word “choice” is used here
in the sense of adopting one of at least two alternative fates,
or trajectories, in the state-space available to the living being
in question, including, but not limited to, movement (or lack
thereof) in the physical space. By no means does the use of
this word imply involvement of a mind or consciousness. In our
sense, flipping a metabolically or genetically wired switch also is
a choice if its probability depends on outside stimuli and internal
settings (previous history) of the biological system concerned.
TIME TO CROSS SOME BORDERS?
Nevertheless, a new definition may not be enough, unless
accompanied by a certain shift of perspective. Carefully mapping
the trench separating behavioral phenomena from those “more
easily understood as developmental changes” (Levitis et al., 2009)
would, in turn, in the interests of consistency call for a similar
demarcation between behavioral biology and physiology, a task
which may be impossible to attain without discarding many
classical behavioral studies. Instead, we propose that the existing
overlap between behavioral science and physiology ought to
be taken as a glorious example of peaceful co-existence of
two disciplines addressing the same subject from two different
angles. Such a view, based on delimiting the fields of inquiry
by methodology and perspective rather than by subject, is
extensible also to the relationship between behavioral sciences
and developmental biology. We believe that the recent plant
investigations provide a sufficient justification for doing so.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
FC drafted the manuscript and performed the final editing. VŽ
and AM contributed ideas and parts of the text, and participated
in editing the manuscript. All authors have approved the final
version prior to submission.
FUNDING
This work has been supported by the Ministry of Education,
Youth, and Sports of the Czech Republic project LO1417.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
FC thanks Charles I. Abramson for a stimulating exchange of
ideas that has developed into this paper.
REFERENCES
Abramson, C. I., and Chicas-Mosier, A. M. (2016). Learning in plants: lessons from
Mimosa pudica. Front. Psychol. 7:417. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00417
Abramson, C. I., and Place, A. J. (2005). Note regarding the word ‘behavior’ in
glossaries of introductory textbooks, dictionaries, and encyclopedias devoted to
psychology. Percept. Mot. Skills 101, 568–574. doi: 10.2466/pms.101.6.568-574
Abramson, C. I. (2013). Problems of teaching the behaviorist perspective in the
cognitive revolution. Behav. Sci. 3, 55–71. doi: 10.3390/bs3010055
Barbieri, M. (2003). The Organic Codes – An Introduction to Semantic Biology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bertossa, R. C. (2011).Morphology and behaviour: functional links in development
and evolution. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 366, 2056–2068. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2011.0035
Cahill, J. F., and McNickle, G. G. (2011). The behavioral ecology of
nutrient foraging by plants. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 42, 289–311. doi:
10.1146/annurev-ecolsys-102710-145006
Calvo, P., and Baluška, F. (2015). Conditions for minimal intelligence across
eukaryota: a cognitive science perspective. Front. Psychol. 6:1329. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01329
Ciszak, M., Comparini, D., Mazzolai, B., Baluška, F., Arecchi, F. T., Vicsek, T.,
et al. (2012). Swarming behavior in plant roots. PLoS ONE 7:e29759. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0029759
Clarke, E. (2012). Plant individuality: a solution to the demographer’s dilemma.
Biol. Philos. 27, 321–361. doi: 10.1007/s10539-012-9309-3
Crews, D., Weisberg, S. A., and Sarkar, S. (2015). Hazards inherent in
interdisciplinary behavioral research. Front. Zool. 12:S21. doi: 10.1186/1742-
9994-12-s1-s21
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 622
Cvrcˇková et al. Rethinking the Concept of Behavior
Cvrcˇková, F., Lipavská, H., and Žárský, V. (2009). Plant intelligence: why, why not
or where? Plant Signal. Behav. 4, 394–399. doi: 10.4161/psb.4.5.8276
Darwin, C., and Darwin, F. (1880). The Power of Movements in Plants. London:
John Murray.
Depuydt, S. (2014). Arguments for and against self and non-self root recognition
in plants. Front. Plant Sci. 5:614. doi: 10.3389/fpls.2014.00614
Falik, O., Reides, P., Gersani, M., and Novoplansky, A. (2005). Root navigation
by self inhibition. Plant Cell Environ. 28, 562–569. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-
3040.2005.01304.x
Funk, H. (2013). Adam Zalužanský’s “De sexu plantarum” (1592). an early
pioneering chapter on plant sexuality. Arch. Nat. Hist. 40, 244–256. doi:
10.3366/anh.2013.0171
Gianoli, E. (2015). The behavioural ecology of climbing plants. AoB Plants
7:plv013. doi: 10.1093/aobpla/plv013
Hodgkinson, T., Yuan, X. F., and Bayat, A. (2014). Electrospun silk fibroin
fiber diameter influences in vitro dermal fibroblast behavior and promotes
healing of ex vivo wound models. J. Tissue Eng. 5:2041731414551661. doi:
10.1177/2041731414551661
Jarius, S., and Wildermann, P. (2015). And Pavlov still rings a bell: summarising
the evidence for the use of a bell in Pavlov’s iconic experiments on classical
conditioning. J. Neurol. 262, 2177–2178. doi: 10.1007/s00415-015-7858-5
Kauffman, S. (2000). Investigations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Levitis, D. A., Lidicker, W. Z., and Freund, G. (2009). Behavioural biologists
don’t agree on what constitutes behaviour. Anim. Behav. 78, 103–110. doi:
10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.03.018
Markoš, A. (2002). Readers of the Book of Life: Contextualizing Developmental
Evolutionary Biology. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Markoš, A., and Cvrcˇková, F. (2013). The meanings of information, code ... and
meaning. Biosemiotics 6, 61–75. doi: 10.1007/s12304-012-9155-3
Marrone, A. K., Kucherenko, M. M., Rishko, V. M., and Shcherbata, H. R.
(2011). New dystrophin/dystroglycan interactors control neuron behavior in
Drosophila eye. BMC Neurosci. 12:93. doi: 10.1186/1471-2202-12-93
Meyer, K. M., Soldaat, L. L., Auge, H., and Thulke, H. H. (2014). Adaptive and
selective seed abortion reveals complex conditional decision making in plants.
Am. Nat. 183, 376–383. doi: 10.1086/675063
Oyama, S. (2000). The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and
Evolution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Pigliucci, M. (2010). Genotype-phenotype mapping and the end of the ‘genes as
blueprint’ metaphor. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 365, 557–566. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2009.0241
Robinson, A. (1918). Behaviour as a psychological concept. Proc. Aristotelian Soc.
New Ser. 18, 271–285.
Silvertown, J. W. (1984). Phenotypic variety in seed germination behavior: the
ontogeny and evolution of somatic polymorphism in seeds.Am. Nat. 124, 1–16.
doi: 10.1086/284249
Stenhouse, D. (1974). The Evolution of Intelligence – A General Theory and Some of
Its Implications. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Thellier, M., Demongeot, J., Norris, V., Guespin, J., Ripoll, C., and Thomas,
R. (2004). A logical (discrete) formulation for the storage and recall of
environmental signals in plants. Plant Biol. 6, 590–597. doi: 10.1055/s-2004-
821090
Tokoyoda, K., Egawa, T., Sugiyama, T., Choi, B. I., and Nagasawa, T. (2004).
Cellular niches controlling B lymphocyte behavior within bone marrow
during development. Immunity 20, 707–718. doi: 10.1016/j.immuni.2004.
05.001
Trewavas, A. (2003). Aspects of plant intelligence. Ann. Bot. 92, 1–20. doi:
10.1093/aob/mcg101
Trewavas, A. (2009).What is plant behaviour? Plant Cell Environ. 32, 606–616. doi:
10.1111/j.1365-3040.2009.01929.x
Trewavas, A. (2014). Plant Behaviour and Intelligence. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
van Loon, L. C. (2016). The intelligent behavior of plants. Trends Plant Sci. 21,
286–294. doi: 10.1016/j.tplants.2015.11.009
Wagmann, K., Hautekèete, N. C., Piquot, Y., Meunier, C., Schmitt, S. E.,
and Van Dijk, H. (2012). Seed dormancy distribution: explanatory
ecological factors. Ann. Bot. 110, 1205–1219. doi: 10.1093/aob/
mcs194
Whissell, C., Abramson, C. I., and Barber, K. R. (2013). The search for cognitive
terminology: an analysis of comparative psychology journal titles. Behav. Sci. 3,
133–142. doi: 10.3390/bs3010133
Žárský, V., and Tupý, J. (1995). A missed anniversary: 300 years after Rudolf Jacob
Camerarius. “De sexu plantarum epistola.” Sexual Plant Reprod. 8, 375–376.
doi: 10.1007/BF00243206
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Cvrcˇková, Žárský and Markoš. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 622
